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Abstract 
M&A deals create more value for acquiring firm shareholders post-2009 than ever before. 
Public acquisitions fuel positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for acquirers 
while stock-for-stock deals no longer destroy value. Mega deals, priced at least $500 mil, 
typically associated with more pronounced agency problems, investor scrutiny and media 
attention, seem to be driving the documented upturn. Acquiring shareholders now gain $62 
mil around the announcement of such deals; a $325 mil gain improvement compared to 1990-
2009. The corresponding synergistic gains have also catapulted to more than $542 mil 
pointing to overall value creation from M&As on a large scale. Our results are robust to 
different measures and controls and appear to be linked with profound improvements in the 
quality of corporate governance among acquiring firms in the aftermath of the 2008 financial 
crisis.     
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Value Creation from M&As: New Evidence 
 
1. Introduction 
One of the most stylized facts in the corporate finance literature is that mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As) of listed companies tend to destroy value for acquiring firm 
shareholders more often than they create. During the previous two decades this empirical 
observation has been recurrently highlighted by academic and market research as well as the 
business press.
1
 Considering that deals involving listed firms are typically subject to 
extensive publicity and investor scrutiny, and that their high failure likelihood and associated 
challenges have been extensively documented and deliberated, it is puzzling that they 
regularly fall short of creating shareholder value. This paper aims to examine how value 
creation from acquisitions has evolved more recently in light of important developments that 
can potentially impinge on the quality of corporate investment decisions.  
One of the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis – the worst in recent history - is that it 
put internal control mechanisms, corporate cultures, executive compensation and risk 
management processes on the spotlight (see e.g. Gupta and Leech, 2015; Ittner and Keusch, 
2015). Accordingly, its aftermath has seen an unprecedented regulatory overhaul, a surge in 
shareholder activism and litigation cases, as well as government-driven reform efforts, 
initially focused on financial institutions, fuelling revisions targeted at all listed U.S. 
companies.
2
 In addition, the on-going evolution in corporate governance in the post-financial 
crisis era is not merely confined to mandatory reforms but characterised by a more pervasive 
shift towards the voluntary adoption of practices (e.g. more efficient incentive structures, 
greater director specialisation and diversity, increased emphasis on the risks associated with 
strategic goals, the rise of “stakeholder democracy”, and information technology governance) 
that aimed to enhance the value creation mechanism and convey more confidence to the 
public. Such extraordinary developments have the potential to positively influence the quality 
                                                 
1
 See for example Mueller (1997), Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), Damodaran (2005), Bruner (2002), 
Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), Boston Consulting Group (2007), Betton et al. (2008), among others.  
2
 The Dodd-Frank reform act that passed in 2010,  although aimed primarily at financial institutions, it also 
enhanced the effectiveness of monitoring and governance systems for all U.S. listed companies by introducing 
new mandatory disclosure rules, fine-tuning executive compensation, granting more powers to shareholders and 
bolstering the accountability of executives and directors.  
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of corporate investment decision making associated with inorganic growth and, in particular, 
the strategic selection, synergy justification, deal implementation, and post-merger 
integration processes, implying the need for a thorough investigation of acquisition 
investments post-2009.  
 
To that end, we study the characteristics and performance of M&As during a previously 
unexplored recent period and draw important comparisons with the two decades of the 90s 
and 00s. Our M&A sample comprises of 26,078 M&A deals announced between 1990 and 
2015, out of which 5,694 involve listed target firms. M&A activity remained upbeat during 
the post-financial crisis recovery with a new wave of deals emerging after 2009 and peaking 
in 2015, a landmark year for U.S and global M&A deal volumes.
3
 From 2010 through 2015 
U.S. listed acquirers announced 3,811 deals valued at $3.07tril, more than during the 6
th
 
merger wave of 2003-2007 documented by Alexandridis et al (2012). Among the drivers of 
the heightened activity in recent years has been the combination of the relatively challenging 
operating conditions with many companies struggling to increase sales on the one side, and 
historically low borrowing costs on the other, making acquisitions an attractive way to 
enhance top line growth. 
 
Our findings point to significant changes in deal attributes and quality during the most recent 
period. Acquiring firms create discernible shareholder value through public acquisitions post-
2009 for the first time. The average acquirer was subject to an abnormal return of 1.05% 
around the acquisition announcement of a public deal. Compared to an average loss of -
1.08% recorded from 1990 through 2009 this represents a rather discernible improvement. It 
corresponds to a $30.2 mil gain to acquiring shareholders in the typical deal, a $208 mil 
improvement relative to pre-2010. A compelling 54% of public deals are now associated with 
positive acquirer abnormal returns relative to only 39% in the previous decade and 43% 
during the 90s. The return differentials are prevalent among both cash and stock financed 
deals, while this is to our knowledge the first time a study documents non-value-destroying 
stock-for-stock deals for acquirers within a U.S. sample. By any measure, acquiring firms 
create more value for their shareholders post-2009. This performance turnaround seems to be 
associated with bidders piecing together deals with superior strategic fit. The overall 
synergistic benefit has improved markedly - more than three-fold– during the most recent 
                                                 
3
 According to Deloitte, M&A Index 2016 and the WSJ-Dealogic Investment Banking Scorecard the value of 
global and U.S. M&As surpassed $4 tril. and $2 tril respectively, the highest on record since at least 2007.   
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period, with the average deal being subject to a 4.51% or $309 mil combined gain for 
acquiring and target companies; to our knowledge the highest ever documented by any recent 
U.S. study.  
 
The documented shift in acquirer returns for public acquisitions is so significant that they 
now generate comparable gains to private ones, contradicting conventional wisdom that 
bidders in private deals outperform those acquiring public firms by a large margin. Although, 
transactions involving private targets continue to generate significant gains to acquirers 
during the most recent period, they do not benefit shareholders more on average than in 
previous decades. As a result, any improvement in deal quality is confined only to 
acquisitions of listed targets which tend to be substantially larger, subject to heightened 
media attention and have been historically more susceptible to value destruction. This is 
consistent with the fact that public acquisitions are likely to entail a greater degree of 
reputational exposure for corporate executives and directors, making them more susceptible 
to improvements or regime shifts in corporate governance (Dahya et al. 2016).  
 
To gain further insight on this issue we also investigate a sub-set of 3,150 completed M&A 
deals valued at least $500mil (henceforth “mega-deals”).4 During the last 25 years mega-
deals comprised more than 85% (94% in 2015) of our overall M&A sample’s market value 
representing the bulk of inorganic corporate investment and an important part of the U.S. 
economy (more than 5% of GDP in 2015).  The historical tendency of M&As to fail is more 
accentuated among large acquisitions with a number of recent studies pointing out that 
“mega-deals” priced over $500mil or $1bil end up costing shareholders more.5 A plethora of 
sizeable mergers and acquisitions, from the frequently quoted landmark deals of AOL-Time 
Warner, Daimler- Chrysler and HP-Compaq to more recent ones such as Rio-Tinto-Alcan, 
Bank of America-Countrywide, eBay- Skype and Kmart-Sears to name a few, have all been 
                                                 
4
 The mega-deal classification was motivated by the fact that the breakpoint for the top deal value quintile of all 
US M&As during our sample period is around $500mil. It also does not affect the direction of our results or 
main conclusions which are similar when the mega-deal threshold is set to $250mil, $750 mil. Or $1bil. 
although employing a higher threshold reduces the size of this sub-set substantially.   
5
 A report by the Boston Consulting Group  (2007)  shows that “mega-deals” with a value of more than $1 
billion destroy nearly twice as much value as smaller deals, while Bloomberg (2002) reports that 61% of merger 
deals worth at least $500 million end up costing shareholders. In a more recent study McKinsey (2012) finds 
that only large deals are on average subject to negative abnormal returns, especially among faster growing 
sectors. The Financial Times (2015) also posit that expensive mega-deals are damaging for everyone, except for 
top executives and financial advisors. Alexandridis et.al (2013) report a striking $518 mil loss for acquiring 
shareholders in the average large deal between 1990 and 2007. 
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branded as failures since they have resulted in sizable write-offs and shareholder losses.
6
 
Since mega-deals have been linked to large scale losses for acquiring shareholders, they tend 
to involve a higher degree of reputational exposure for firms, top executives, and the board of 
directors. We find that the improvement in gains to acquiring firms is significantly more 
pronounced in mega deals, with the average acquirer being subject to an abnormal return of 
2.54% post-2009, corresponding to a $62.3 mil gain for its shareholders. The synergistic 
gains in this case amount to a thumping $542mil in the average deal. Moreover, the 
compelling shift in acquirer returns during the most recent period is not confined only to 
public mega-deals but also applies to private ones – albeit to a lesser extent- suggesting that it 
is driven primarily by the larger deals in general. Cross sectional regressions controlling for a 
range of pivotal acquisition gain determinants, as well as industry and company fixed effects 
confirm that the bulk of the improvement in acquisition gains post-2009 stems from mega-
deals. A possible explanation for this result is that any positive developments in the aftermath 
of the financial crisis and especially in corporate governance has mainly impinged on sizable 
investment decisions where agency conflicts are more substantial given the larger value at 
stake and higher degree of reputational exposure for corporate executives and directors. This 
would result in larger deals being more reflective of an improvement in M&A quality.  
 
Our results are consistent with a recent shift in the quality and drivers of M&A deals and 
point to value creation from large M&As on a great scale, contradicting the status quo that 
such type of acquisitions destroy value more often than they create. A number of indicators 
suggest that the documented turnaround is concurrent to a more widespread change in the 
investment behaviour of firms and corporate executives. A measure of CEO over-optimism 
based on executive stock options exercise in acquiring firms, which has previously been 
associated with value-destroying acquisition investments (Malmendier and Tate, 2008), 
indicates that hubristic behaviour has diminished significantly during the last few years. The 
fundamental change in M&A drivers and motives, as well as how top executives view 
acquisitions, is also evident from the fact that synergistic benefits are quoted by acquirers as 
part of M&A announcements more than twice as often relative to the past. Finally, a measure 
of overall investment efficiency that takes into account acquisitions, CAPEX, R&D, as well 
                                                 
6
 Several explanations have been put forward for why large deals fail to pay off more frequently, with the most 
prevalent ones being overpayment (Loderer and Martin, 1990) emanating from hefty private benefits (Jensen, 
1986, Grinstein and Hribar, 2004; Harford and Li, 2007) or adverse managerial traits such us overestimation of 
the top executives’ ability to extract acquisition gains (Roll, 1986 and Malmendier and Tate, 2008) and 
integration complexity, including cultural incompatibility, which can hamper post-merger integration 
(Shrivastava, 1986; Hayward, 2002; Ahern, 2010 and Alexandridis et al. 2013).  
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as asset disposals based on Richardson (2006) shows that the extent of over- and under-
investment has significantly receded post-2009. This implies that corporate decision makers 
have aimed towards more optimal investment allocation in recent years, which bonds well 
with our main findings on value creation from M&As. 
 
The fact that the documented improvement in corporate investment behaviour and quality 
occurred in the aftermath of the worst financial crisis since 1929 suggest that our results can 
in theory be driven by this hefty shock. Ensuing changes at the corporate internal control and 
monitoring levels in response to the emergence of a more shareholder-centric environment 
deserve special attention. Although some anecdotally reported developments (e.g. greater 
focus on director specialisation and experience, strategic risk management, and value 
creation) are not directly quantifiable due to the limited availability of information at the firm 
level, we examine the impact of more conventional dimensions of corporate governance that 
are likely to capture any broad trend for change. We document recent surges in acquiring 
companies’ board independence, the ownership of independent directors and equity based 
compensation of their top executives, along with a decline in anti-takeover provisions. To 
investigate whether and to what extent the superior performance of mega-deals post-2009 can 
be attributed to changes in these governance proxies we isolate their exogenous pre-to-post 
financial crisis variation, by utilising a two-stage instrumental variable approach. The 
evidence is consistent with the conjecture that our 2010-15 time indicator is a strong predictor 
of changes in corporate governance, which, in turn, can explain acquirer returns. This in turn 
corroborates that developments at the corporate board level have an important role to play 
through fostering more accountability and restraint in the executive suite, leading to superior 
acquisition decisions that deliver larger synergistic benefits and also cater for more of the 
gains to be channelled to acquiring shareholders.  
 
Our study marks a milestone for research on mergers and acquisitions, as well as the effects 
of the 2008 financial crisis on corporate decision making. The documented findings pose a 
challenge to the status quo in the acquisition gains literature and are consistent with a 
structural shift in the quality and efficacy of corporate investment, manifested in M&A 
decisions that deliver higher returns to shareholders than ever before. From the seminal work 
of Travlos (1987) and Loderer and Martin (1990) to the more recent evidence provided by 
Fuller et al. (2002), Moeller et al. (2004, 2005), Betton, et al. (2008) and Alexandridis et al. 
(2013), the general consensus has been that public acquisitions, and particularly large ones, 
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destroyed value for acquiring shareholders more often than they created for more than 30 
years. Our work brings to light for the first time that this trend may have come to an end and 
that acquiring firms consummating public acquisitions more recently increase shareholder 
value on a sizable scale, in accordance with the predictions of the neoclassical theory of 
M&As (Ahern and Weston, 2007).
7
 Most notably, the documented improvement in 
acquisition gains is for the most part concentrated in larger deals – both private and public – 
which tend to be associated with more pronounced agency problems, investor scrutiny, media 
attention and reputational exposure. Along these lines, to the extent that the turnaround in 
M&A performance is driven by the recent developments in internal control mechanisms, our 
study offers significant contribution to existing literature on the quality-enhancing role of 
corporate governance in acquisition decisions (Masulis et al. 2007; Dahya, et al. 2016). To 
the best of our knowledge, it is also the first study to provide evidence of the consequences of 
the 2008 financial crisis on corporate investments, which leads up to a broader intuition; 
large-scale financial shocks can ultimately have favourable ripple effects on focal aspects of 
corporate decision making, bolstering the value creation mechanism. The latter notion is 
consistent to the stylised argument on the benefits of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 
1942), which highlights the ability of modern economic systems to reconfigure themselves 
via extraordinary events, so that value-destroying ventures and practices are abandoned in 
favour of novel, wealth-increasing ones. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data used and sample 
statistics. Section 3 reports the main empirical results including a multivariate analysis of 
acquirer returns and synergy gains. Section 4 presents the results from a propensity score 
matching approach. Section 5 utilises a two-stage instrumental variable approach to examine 
the impact of corporate governance and Section 6 provides evidence on the overall 
investment efficiency of acquiring firms. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. Data and Summary Statistics 
The sample of M&As is from Thomson SDC and includes U.S. deals announced between 
1990 and 2015. We exclude repurchases, recapitalisations, self-tenders, exchange offers, 
                                                 
7
 Along similar lines, some recent studies have also found evidence pointing to significant net economic benefits 
from M&As using non- traditional measures of value improvement (see Bhagat et al, 2005 and Humphery-
Jenner et al., 2016). 
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acquisitions of remaining interest, minority stake purchases and intra-corporate 
restructurings.
8
 Deals have an inflation adjusted value of at least $5 mil in 2015 dollar terms, 
a relative size of at least 1%, and the acquirer owns no more than 20% of the target prior to 
the acquisition announcement and seeks to end up with more than 50% following completion. 
Acquiring firms are U.S. companies listed in NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with data on 
CRSP. Targets are public or private firms. There are 26,078 deals that satisfy these criteria, 
out of which of which 5,694 are public and 20,384 private.  
Table 1 and Figure 1 show the distribution of deals over time. Deal activity decelerated as a 
result of the 2007-08 financial crisis that brought the sixth merger wave (see Alexandridis, et. 
al 2012) to an end but recovered again in 2010 and has remained upbeat until at least 2015. 
The rebound is significantly more pronounced in terms of the total dollar value spent during 
the last two years in the sample and reached $947bil in 2015; a 15-year high. Mega-deals - 
worth at least $500mil - comprise more than 85% of the total dollar value spent for M&As by 
U.S. acquirers in our sample during the last 25 years ($12.5 tril) and 94% in 2015 ($891.4 
bil). This indicates a tendency towards larger acquisitions during the most recent period.  
 [Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
To gain further insight into the sample’s sectoral composition we also examine if there are 
any significant differentials in the industry classification of firms targeted in acquisition deals 
between the most recent period in our sample (2010-15) and the previous two decades. For 
brevity we have not tabulated the results since we find only trivial differences. One pattern 
that stands out is the increase in acquisition activity within the healthcare and 
pharmaceuticals segment (from 9.6% to 13.2% of the overall sample). This can be largely 
attributed to the fact that several pharmaceutical companies struggled to cope with expiring 
patents on a number of key drugs (“patent cliff”), thus turning their attention to M&As in 
order to meet investor growth expectations (Fortune, 2015).
9
 The ultimately withdrawn $160 
bil Pfizer-Alergan deal in 2015 was the largest ever announced within the sector. Moreover, 
the utilities and telecom industries have also recorded slight declines in deal activity through 
time, which is not surprising given that they have progressively become more mature and 
saturated.   
                                                 
8
 As part of the intra-corporate restructuring exclusion, we omit transactions where the acquirer and target have 
the same name or ultimate parent.  
9
 “The real reasons for the pharma merger boom”, July 2015, Fortune 
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Table 2 reports our sample’s summary statistics for the two sub-periods; 1990-2009 and 
2010-15 as well as differentials between these periods. The post-2009 period encompasses 
the recovery in the M&A market documented in Figure 1 and to our knowledge has not been 
the subject of extensive empirical investigation in prior literature. Alternative sample 
specifications or partitions (e.g. comparing 2010-15 with the 90s and 00s decades or with 
other high market valuation periods such as 1998-99 and 2005-07 or including year 2009 in 
the most recent period) are also explored for robustness in untabulated tests and produce very 
similar differentials. Results are also segregated by target type (public and private). 
Accounting ratios are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level where relevant. Acquiring 
firm size (SIZE) has increased significantly through time and the same is the case for target 
size and deal value (DEAL VALUE). The average deal size has increased from 1.7bil in 1990-
2009 to 2.7bil in 2010-15. Acquirer size has increased at a faster pace than deal size leading 
to a decrease in deal relative size (RELSIZE). Further, the percentage of M&As priced at least 
500mil (Mega-Deals) has also increased markedly during the most recent period. More than 
60% of mega-deals involved private targets compared to 42% in the two preceding decades 
which indicates a more recent trend towards larger private deals.  
Both acquirers and targets (to a lesser extent) are subject to lower valuations post-2009 as 
proxied by the market-to-book ratio (M/B). Given the evidence on the relation between firm 
valuation and payment method (see for example Dong at al., 2006; Faccio and Masulis, 
2005), this may also partly explain the plunge in the share of equity consideration (STOCK) 
in acquisition offers during this period. Only around 38.1% of public deal offers in 2010-
2015 for instance comprise stock-swaps, which represents a remarkable decline from the 
56.2% recorded pre-2010. The documented scarcity of equity financing during the most 
recent period can also be attributed to the availability of ample corporate liquidity (see FCF) 
bolstered by healthy profitability as well as the historic lows in interest rates which facilitated 
access to debt financing. The combination of these factors led to an equally significant 
increase in the cash component (CASH) of acquisition offers during the most recent period, 
where the median deal is sponsored with more than 55% cash.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Further, the percentage of diversified deals (DIVERS) has decreased only in public deals over 
time, while the share of cross-border deals (CROSS BORDER) has increased across the 
board. This is not unexpected given the race for globalisation as well as the tendency of U.S. 
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companies to expand more in emerging markets in order to enhance their growth prospects. 
Another interesting observation is that there are fewer failed deals (WITHDRAWN) during the 
more recent M&A period. Only 11% and 1% of public and private deals respectively have 
been withdrawn following their announcement relative to 15.7% and 3.8% during the 
previous two decades. Considering the more stringent regulatory environment affecting 
M&As, and in particular competition policy (Moshirian, 2011), one would have expected to 
see more deal cancellations during 2010-15. The lower withdrawal rate documented may 
relate to more efficient selection and planning of M&A deals or to more reluctance in 
cancelling announced transactions in order to avoid incurring hefty break-up fees (FT, 
2016).
10
 The former explanation is also supported by the fact that time to deal completion has 
also diminished.  
Information on deal motives mentioned in actual acquisition announcements available on 
SDC (Deal Purpose Code) suggests that M&A drivers have evolved significantly post-2009. 
More specifically, synergistic benefits are quoted as part of the deal announcement (SYNRGY 
MOTIVE) in more than 61% (33%) of public (private) deals, relative to 25.5% (7.1%) during 
1990-2009. If this trend reflects a genuine change in acquisition decision drivers then it 
should translate to greater benefits for shareholders. Yet, there is no evidence that target 
shareholders receive higher premia (PREMIUM) post-2009 than in the past. Thus, if 
anything, target shareholders do not appear to be getting the lion’s share of any additional 
synergistic value.   
Several statistics point to sizeable improvements in acquiring firm attributes at the C-suite 
and corporate board level that may impact the quality of acquisition decisions. CEO 
overconfidence, a well-documented managerial trait responsible for value-destroying 
acquisitions (Malmendier and Tate, 2008 and Billett and Qian, 2008) appears to be less of a 
problem for acquiring companies during the most recent period. An overconfidence measure 
(HUBRIS) based on the timing of stock options exercise (Malmendier and Tate, 2005) 
reflects significantly lower levels of managerial hubris post-2009, with less than 35% (42%) 
of CEOs that carry out public (private) deals failing to exercise their options twice during 
their tenure although they are 67% in the money. Improvements in corporate governance are 
also quite compelling. The representation of independent directors on the board of the 
                                                 
10
 Officer (2003) finds that the presence of a termination fee payable by the target increases the probability of 
deal completion by 20%. The probability of completion may be higher in recent years, as the typical termination 
fee of around 3% before the 2008 crisis has more than doubled after the crisis (Financial Times, 2016).  
10 
 
average acquiring firm (BI) has reached around 80% in 2010-2015 relative to 65-66% prior to 
this.
11
 This signifies a remarkable milestone in the board independence regime; with 8 in 10 
directors being independent there isn’t much more scope for further improvement. Moreover, 
the share of equity based compensation (EBC) in the top executive’s salary as in Chauvin and 
Shenoy (2001) – which has been previously linked to acquisition quality (Datta et al. 2001) - 
has increased significantly.
12
 Finally, the stock ownership of independent directors (IDO), 
one of the most consistent predictors of corporate performance among other corporate 
governance indices and variables, according to Bhagat et. al (2008), has also increased 
markedly. This metric is informative since independent directors are not typically rewarded 
for effective monitoring. A rise in independent directors’ connectedness to the wealth the 
firm generates may thus be taken to imply stronger incentives for effective monitoring and 
more effective alignment of interests between directors and shareholders. Accordingly, 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) find a positive relation between the stock ownership of board 
members and both, future operating performance as well as the probability of disciplinary 
management turnover. Overall, the trends in all conventional dimensions of corporate 
governance are consistent with significant improvements in internal control and incentive 
alignment mechanisms post-financial crisis. Such developments, along with shifts in other 
M&A characteristics between the most recent period and the previous two decades, can exert 
an influence on the quality of corporate investment decisions and their value creation 
potential. 
 
3. Main Empirical Results 
3.1 Univariate analysis of acquisition gains 
As a first step in the analysis of acquisition gains we study a comprehensive set of value 
creation metrics. Table 3 reports the univariate results partitioned by two sub-period and 
target type (private or public), along with the respective differentials. Panel A reports results 
for a sample of 24,372 completed deals with acquirer return data.
13
 ACAR3 is the acquirer 
cumulative abnormal return for a 3-day (-1,+1) announcement window based on the Brown 
and Warner (1985) market model, which is estimated over the window (-301, -46) relative to 
                                                 
11
 Data on the representation of independent directors is from ISS (ex-Risk Metrics). 
12
 Yet, there is also anecdotal evidence that equity based compensation can in fact lead to corporate short-
termism if it counteracts the effect of stock price performance on executive compensation (Bolton et al., 2006).  
13
 The sample here is somewhat smaller in than in Table 2 because we examine acquisition gains only for 
completed deals.   
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the acquisition announcement day.
14
 For all deals we report a statistically significant 
improvement (0.21%) in acquirer returns during the most recent (2010-15) period. Yet, this 
differential is driven exclusively by the sub-set of 4,773 public deals since the median private 
deal generates almost the same (0.75%) positive ACAR post-2015 relative to before. The 
pattern in public deals is particularly compelling; although acquirer returns are typically 
negative and significant during the previous two decades, this appears to have changed 
profoundly post-2009. The mean (median) ACAR in 2010-15 is positive and statistically 
significant 1.05% (0.29%); an increase of 2.13 (1.14) percentage points relative 1990-2009. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first study in at least two and a half decades 
documenting statistically significant value creation for acquiring shareholders to such extent 
for a large sample of U.S. public acquisitions. 
 
The outperformance of acquirers in 2010-15 can be attributed to the fact that there are more 
deals with positive ACARs (ACAR+) recently (54.2%) relative to the past (41.8%). The 
observation that more than half of large M&A deals fail to create value for acquiring 
companies during the 90s and 00s appears to no longer apply for the most recent period 
where a majority of acquirers completing public deals are subject to positive abnormal 
returns. One might suggest that this represents a rather significant shift in the status quo. 
Dollar gains ($GAIN), computed as the abnormal dollar increase in the market capitalisation 
of the acquiring firm, are also in the same direction. In the post-2009 period the average 
acquirer realises a market cap gain of $30.2 mil in the three days surrounding the acquisition 
announcement. Prior to this, acquiring shareholders typically lost $178.1 mil which attests to 
a compelling improvement in shareholder gains during the most recent period. Further, 
LARGE LOSS, a dummy variable takes the value of 1 if the variable $GAIN points to a loss 
equal to or greater than $1 bil., following Moeller et al. (2005), shows that the fraction of 
deals resulting in large shareholder losses has decreased considerably. 
 
The fact that acquirers used significantly less stock financing in public acquisitions during the 
most recent period may be driving our results. For this reason Panel A also differentiates 
between different financing sources in acquisition offers. The performance turnaround 
persists both for all-cash and all-stock deals. In fact, the highest turnaround is recorded for 
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 In unreported tests we also estimate ACAR32 for a (-30,+1) announcement window to capture part of the pre-
announcement, opaque “merger talks” period. This measure of acquirer returns yields very similar results with 
ACAR3. 
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stock-swap financed public acquisitions (2.3%) which are no longer subject to negative 
abnormal returns during the most recent period. This is again to our knowledge the first time 
non-negative announcement returns are reported for stock-financed public U.S. deals. Across 
all payment methods abnormal returns change from negative and significant in 1990-2009 to 
zero or positive and significant in 2010-15.  
 
Synergy gains for public acquisitions (SYNRGY) are estimated as the market-value-weighted 
average of acquirer and target CARs where data for the target is available on CRSP. The 
improvement in combined gains is striking; the average SYNRGY for the 2010-15 period is 
4.51%. Synergistic gains have increased by more than 3 times relative to the previous 20 
years. In dollar terms ($SYNRGY) this corresponds to a striking $309 mil gain for the typical 
mega-deal post-2009 relative to a $25.4 mil loss in the previous decade. A measure of deal 
value added ($VALUE ADDED), popularised by McKinsey (2015) and estimated as the ratio 
of total market capitalisation change for the acquirer and target around the acquisition 
announcement adjusted for market movements and scaled by the deal value, also points to 
large improvements in combined value creation during the most recent period.
15
 First, our 
findings are consistent with the surge in synergy related motives reported in Table 2 and 
suggest that acquirers carried out by and large superior deals, with better synergistic 
prospects during the most recent period. Second, returns to target companies (TCAR) have 
also increased proportionately the additional synergistic gains seem to be captured by both 
acquiring and target firm shareholders.
16
  
 
The fact that an improvement in M&A value creation is documented only for public 
acquisitions – and not for private - yields interesting implications. Deals involving listed 
targets tend to be larger and associated with a higher degree of reputational exposure given 
the heightened media attention they typically receive (Dahya, et al. 2016). Moreover, the 
value destruction reported in prior M&A literature primarily applies to this sub-set, rather 
than private deals– something we also confirm in this study. It is therefore possible that any 
greater effort or restraint among corporate executives and boards in response to shifts in 
governance quality might be concentrated in sizable investment decisions where the tendency 
to destroy value was more of a problem in the first place and agency conflicts are more 
                                                 
15
 “M&A 2014: Return of the big Deal”, April 2015, McKinsey&Company. 
16
 In Table 2, the deal premium has not increased during the most recent period. Hence, the higher TCAR may 
also reflect a higher likelihood of deal completion during this period considering that less deals are being 
withdrawn.  
13 
 
substantial. In this case, larger deals would be more reflective of any significant shift in 
M&A quality and value creation, at least during its initial stage, due to the more material 
impact of a sizable consolidation on the acquiring firm and its share price. 
 
To gain further insight on the impact of deal size in driving our results we repeat the 
univariate the analysis in Panel B for a sub-set of 3,150 mega-deals priced at least $500mil.
17
 
The differentials in Panel B between the two periods are significantly more pronounced. The 
mean (median) ACAR for mega-deals in 2010-15 is a resounding 2.54% (1.34%); an increase 
of 2.90 (1.72) percentage points relative 1990-2009.
18
 Although, for brevity, results are 
reported for all mega-deals - private and public – together, in an untabulated test we also 
confirm that abnormal returns are higher for private mega-deals, although to a lesser extent 
(by 0.68%) than for public. The market reaction documented in panel B corresponds to a 
$62.3 mil gain for acquiring shareholders relative to a loss of $262.9mil recorded prior to 
2010. The synergistic gain during the most recent period amounts to a thumping $542mil in 
the average (public) mega-deal; a $618.3mil improvement. The fact that large acquisitions 
typically destroyed more value in the past, as reported in prior literature, is no longer true for 
the latest period in our sample. This points to acquiring companies recently becoming better 
at tackling the challenges associated with larger acquisitions either through attaining more 
strategic combinations and/or more efficiently managing their heightened complexity and 
cumbersome integration process. Moreover, to the extent that more efficient M&A decisions 
post-2009 are attributed to developments that occurred in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
it appears that this environment has primarily affected larger deals where the reputational 
exposure of acquiring firms, top executives, and directors is more pronounced.  
 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 here] 
 
Figures 2 and 3 provide a more complete picture of ACARs around mega-deals. Figure 2 
illustrates annual ACARs along with a fitted polynomial fitted line to account for the wide 
fluctuation in gains and losses and their 5-year moving average. The figure captures a 
progressive improvement in acquirer returns post-2010 beyond levels seen in the early years 
of our sample. Figure 3 depicts the evolution in acquirer CARs from 30 days prior to the 
                                                 
17
 Our results are similar for alternative mega-deal thresholds (including $250mil, $750mil or $1bil). 
18
 Appendix 2 reports details of the 10 largest deals in each of three distinct sample periods. Six out of ten deals 
in 2010-15 are subject to positive announcement CAR compared to zero out of ten in 00s and four out of ten in 
the 90s. 
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acquisition announcement to 30 days after. The difference in pattern between the post-2009 
and pre-2010 period is extraordinary. For the 90s and 00s returns are marginally negative or 
fluctuate around zero up to the acquisition announcement day, at which point they start 
deteriorating to reach almost -3% until day +30. On the contrary, for the 2010-2015 period 
there is a sizable jump in CARs around the announcement day reaching more than 3%, down 
to around 2.7% on day +30. The implied acquisition gain differential 30 days following the 
acquisition announcement between the previous two decades and 2010-15 is to around 5.5%.  
 
 
3.2 Acquirer and synergy gain regressions 
 
In this section we examine the possibility that the documented improvement in acquisition 
gains during the most recent, post-2009 period is attributed to deal, firm, or market 
characteristics, not accounted for in the univariate analysis. We perform a series of cross-
sectional regressions where the dependent variable is ACAR in Panel A and SYNRGY in Panel 
B while the main explanatory variable is an indicator equal to one if the acquisition is 
announced during 2010-2015, and zero otherwise.  
 
We control for key variables that have been shown to affect acquirer returns. These are: i) the 
occurrence of a public deal (PUBLIC) to account for the fact that acquisitions of listed targets 
tend to be associated with lower acquirer returns (Fuller et. al, 2002 and Faccio et. al, 2006); 
ii) an all-stock dummy (ALL STOCK) to control for the negative abnormal returns associated 
with acquisitions of listed targets paid for entirely with stock (Travlos, 1987); iii) the natural 
logarithm of the acquiring firm’s market cap (ASIZE) to account for the negative effect of 
acquirer size on acquirer returns (Moeller et al., 2004), iv) the target-to-acquirer relative size 
(RELSIZE) since larger public deals are evidently subject to more negative abnormal returns 
(Alexandridis et. al, 2013); v) the acquirer market-to-book value (M/B) given the firm 
misvaluation implications for bidders (Moeller et. al, 2005 and Dong et. al, 2006), vi) a 
competing bid variable (COMPET) to capture the potentially negative effect of competition 
on the gains to acquiring firms (Bradley et al., 1988); vii) a control for takeover hostility 
(HOSTILE) since it tends to be negatively associated with acquirer returns (Schwert, 2000); 
viii) a diversification dummy variable (DIVERS) equal to one when the acquirer and target 
have different 2-digit SIC codes to account for the fact that diversifying acquisitions have 
been found to destroy shareholder value (Morck et al, 1990); ix) a cross-border indicator 
15 
 
(CROSS BORDER) equal to one when the target is outside the U.S. since higher 
announcement returns are documented for acquisitions of foreign targets  (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005); x) a serial acquirer control (SERIAL) which accounts for the fact that 
multiple bidders tend to make worse acquisitions  (Fuller et al, 2002 and Billett and Qian, 
2008); xi) the acquiring firm’s leverage (Maloney et al., 1993) and FCF ratios (see e.g. 
Jensen, 1988; Lang et al., 1991); xii) a high market valuation indicator (HIGH MKT VAL) 
equal to one when the deal is announced during a month with an abnormally high de-trended 
market P/E ratio as in Bouwman et al. (2009); finally, we control for industry and company 
fixed effects where relevant. Table 5 reports the regression results.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
The coefficient of the 2010-15 indicator variable in regression 1 is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Deals carried out during the latest period are subject to a 0.45% 
higher ACAR after controlling for other known acquirer return determinants, which confirms 
the recent turnaround in acquisition gains reported in Section 3.1. This superior performance 
is largely attributed to the sizable improvement (by 1.86%) in acquisitions of public targets 
(regression 2) while returns for private deals are not significantly higher during the most 
recent period (regression 5). Moreover, the trend in public acquisitions seems to be driven in 
turn by the subset of mega deals (regression 6) where a much higher increase in CARs of 
3.6% is recorded. Even private mega-deals fare significantly better post-2009 (regression 7) 
albeit the difference there is relatively smaller (0.84%). Overall, cross sectional regressions 
confirm that the tendency of M&As to generate more value for acquiring shareholders is 
significantly more pronounced among larger deals.  
 
In regressions 2, 4 and 9 we examine whether the inclusion of company fixed effects has an 
impact on our results. Golubov et al. (2015) report that firm fixed effects alone explain at 
least as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and deal-specific 
characteristics combined. Accordingly, it is possible that the superior performance of 
acquirers post-2009 can be explained by unobserved, time-invariant firm characteristics. 
Although the inclusion of company dummy variables (6,089 additional variables for 
regression 2 and 1,440 for specification 9) results in a very significant increase in the adj R
2
, 
the coefficient of the main variable of interest 2010-15 remains positive and statistically 
16 
 
significant across the board. Thus, the documented turnaround in acquisition performance is 
unlikely attributed to specific extraordinary acquiring firms.
19
  
 
The univariate results presented in Table 3 suggest that the improvement in acquirer returns 
post-2009 coincides with an unprecedented increase in synergistic gains. Acquiring firms 
have carried out deals with impressive economic benefits potentially channelling more of the 
incremental combined value gains to their own shareholders. In panel B we examine the 
magnitude of the increase in combined gains during the latest period relative to the previous 
two decades in a regression framework, whereby we include the same control variables as in 
Panel A. In this case the dependent variable is the value-weighted combined return to 
acquiring and target firms (SYNRGY GAIN). In regression 10 public deals consummated in 
2010-15 are subject to a 2.81% higher synergy gain relative to those carried out during the 
preceding 20 years, after including all controls. The improvement in synergistic gains is even 
more pronounced for mega deals (regression 12) as with acquirer returns. Therefore, in this 
case too, the typical mega-deal carried out during the latest period truly stands out. 
Controlling for company fixed effects (1,781 additional variables in regression 11 and 808 in 
specification 13) result in somewhat lower coefficients for the time indicator and interaction 
variable although they still remain statistically significant. Overall, results from the synergy 
regressions point to superior synergistic potential post-2009 and are consistent with the 
acquirer return findings.  
[Insert Table 5  here] 
To ensure that the relationships documented in Table 4 are not driven by extreme CAR 
observations we also run quantile regressions estimated at the median and other percentiles 
(25
th
 and 75
th
). Table 5 reports the quantile analysis for mega deals for brevity, although we 
check that results are similar for the sample of all public deals as well. The magnitude of the 
2010-15 time indicator varies but it remains statistically significant at the 1% level in all 6 
specifications. 
 
4. Acquisition gains based on propensity score matching  
 
                                                 
19
 We note that while this analysis offers additional insights the inclusion of company fixed effects reduces 
degrees of freedom significantly in several regressions.  
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To control more directly for observable differences in the deal characteristics between deals 
consummated during the most recent period and prior to this we employ a propensity score 
matching (PSM) technique. Essentially, this approach produces close matches of post-2009 
deals to pre-2010 counterpart transactions on the basis of their similarity, and then compares 
their gains. As a first step we use a logit model to estimate the impact of all firm and deal 
characteristics utilised in Table 4 on the likelihood of a deal being part of the post-2009 sub-
set. Panel A of Table 6 reports the regression results for mega-deals since this sub-set in 
particular appears to be driving the documented improvement in acquisition gains. In 
untablulated results we confirm that results are similar for the sample of all public 
acquisitions. Several variables are important in differentiating 2010-15 deals from their 
counterparts. For instance, post-2009 deals are less likely to be public and financed entirely 
with equity as seen in specification 1. They also tend to be associated with less hostility and 
competition among bidders, and are more likely to be consummated during high valuation 
months, consistent with the summary statistics reported in Table 2. The Public coefficient in 
specification 1 implies that the probability of observing a public deal in 2010-15 is 39% less 
(82% less for a stock-for-stock deal). 
[Insert Table 6  here] 
Panel B reports the PSM results for both performance proxies (CAR and SYNRGY) based on 
two different techniques: i) the nearest-neighbor matching; and ii) the Gaussian kernel 
matching. Propensity scores are estimated from regressions 1 and 2 respectively. Deals are 
matched on the basis of their nearest (one-to-one), thirty, and fifty neighbors. Treated sample 
CAR corresponds to post-2009 CARs and Control CAR to the matched deals’ CARs. Both 
acquirer and synergy gains for the treated samples are higher than the control sample ones, 
and the differentials range from 1.7-1.9% for CAR and from 2.9% to 3.9% for SYNRGY, all 
significant at the 1% level. Overall, our results on alternative nearest predicted probability 
matching approaches corroborate that mega-deals completed during the latest sample period 
outperform very similar deals from the previous two decades. So unless, there are important 
characteristics not captured in the first step of the approach, the outperformance of more 
recent deals seems to be largely robust.  
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5. Do developments in corporate governance drive the results? 
 
Although we report a compelling pattern in the data pointing to unprecedented improvements 
in the quality of M&A decisions following the 2008 financial crisis, questions remain on the 
ultimate driving force that induced such a sharp shift. One possibility is that the 
developments that occurred in response to the crisis at the corporate governance level can 
potentially affect how directors and executives approach the selection and implementation of 
acquisition opportunities, as well as the degree of their accountability toward shareholders in 
carrying out value-increasing investments. The widespread collapse of trust among capital 
providers, the government, and the general public regarding the operation of financial 
institutions had also ripple effects for non-financial institutions, putting corporate governance 
for all listed companies on the spotlight. The ensuing reforms, as part of the Dodd-Frank act 
passed in 2010, introduced new mandatory disclosure rules, re-aligned executive 
compensation, bolstered the accountability of corporate top executives and granted more 
powers to shareholders. However, these mandatory reforms, might in fact account for less 
than half the story, with anecdotal evidence attesting to a much deeper and ubiquitous urge 
for change among listed companies, especially the most sizeable ones.  
 
Accordingly, the aftermath of the recent financial crisis has seen a shift towards the voluntary 
adoption of practices such as more efficient incentive structures, greater director 
specialisation and diversity, increased emphasis on the risks associated with strategic goals 
and operations as well as the rise of “stakeholder democracy” and information technology 
governance, all aiming to enhance the value creation mechanism and convey more 
confidence to the public. Such profound changes in internal control mechanisms can 
potentially induce more shareholder-centric decision-making and - in view of the role 
corporate boards play in M&A decisions (Deutsch et al., 2007; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001) - exert a positive influence on the selection and justification of acquisition investments 
as well as the deal implementation and post-merger integration processes, thereby bringing 
about widespread improvements in acquisition gains. Since some of the aforementioned 
developments in corporate governance are not directly measurable or quantifiable due to the 
limited availability of information at the firm level, we focus on some more conventional 
dimensions that are nonetheless capable of capturing any broad trend for change. These are 
board independence (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999), the stock ownership of independent 
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directors (Bhagat et. al, 2008), and the BCF anti-takeover provisions index (Bebchuck et al., 
2009). 20 
 
To examine whether the hefty improvements in corporate governance documented in Table 3 
with regards to mega-deals are to any extent associated with the positive relationship between 
acquisition gains and our post-financial-crisis indicator, we employ a two-stage regression 
approach as in Dahya et al., (2016). Although the crisis in itself may be seen as an exogenous 
source of variation in corporate governance, partly addressing potential endogeneity 
concerns, the two-stage approach is necessary in order to isolate the effect of this exogenous 
component and determine whether the ultimate source of acquisition gains is associated with 
the pre-to-post crisis variation in corporate governance. Table 7 presents the results from the 
instrumental variable estimation. 
[Insert Table 7  here] 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of the post-2009 indicator in the first 
stage regressions suggests that this period is linked to higher independent director 
representation and stock ownership as well as less anti-takeover provisions among acquiring 
firms (regressions 1, 3 and 5 respectively), after controlling for the same set of deal 
characteristics as in our main regressions.
21
 This suggests that our 2010-15 variable is a 
credible instrument for the corporate governance proxies employed. The BI coefficient in the 
first stage implies a higher representation of independent directors on the board of acquiring 
companies by 14% (so about one additional independent director on a 7-seat board). In the 
second stage OLS where the dependent variable is ACAR, we omit the time indicator and the 
corporate governance variables are based on their expected values from stage one. The results 
here indicate that variations in all three governance proxies are significant determinants of 
acquirer abnormal returns, confirming that the post-2009 turnaround in acquisition 
performance can be linked to improvements in corporate governance. In unreported tests we 
also repeat the same regressions using SYNRGY instead of ACAR and find similar results. 
Moreover, utilising the sample of all public deals, instead of the mega-deals, does not change 
the direction of results.  
                                                 
20
 Although our board independence variable is continuous, in unreported tests we have also used an indicator 
equal to 1 when independent directors comprise more than 50% of the board as in Masulis et al. (2007) and 
obtain similar results. Alternative board independence thresholds, for instance 60%, also produce similar results. 
21
 Since our time indicator 2010-15 captures the difference in corporate governance between a 6-year period 
(2010-15) and a 20-year period (1990-2009) we re-run the test for the sub-sample starting in 2004 and obtain 
similar results.  
20 
 
 
There are of course other concurrent developments emerging at the same time which might 
be captured by our time indicator in the regressions. For instance, changes in the psychology 
of corporate leaders due to a sense of enhanced visibility that might reinforce restraint, 
expedite learning from prior mistakes and foster a focus towards value creation, along with a 
surge in shareholder activism and litigation associated with mergers and acquisitions, can all 
impinge on the quality of investment decisions.
22
 Although these drivers may be seen as 
directly or indirectly related with the governance regime change discussed above, we 
recognise that if acquirer returns are affected by the time-indicator other than through its 
effect on governance then the exclusion restriction in our two-stage approach is violated. 
Consequently, our results on the effect of corporate governance need to be interpreted with 
caution.  
 
To more directly quantify the impact of a change in board independence – our main 
governance proxy – on acquisition gains we employ a diff-in-diff approach for a sub-sample 
of 172 acquirers that have consummated at least one mega-deal both pre-2010 and post-2009. 
We rank these acquirers on the basis of their change in board independence from the fiscal 
year end prior to the year of their last deal in the pre-2010 period to the fiscal year end prior 
to the year of their first deal in 2010-15 (∆BI). Then we also estimate a corresponding 
∆ACAR for each pair. Acquirers in the top ∆BI quintile are subject to an average (median) 
increase in ∆ACAR of 3.03% (1.89%) and those in the bottom quintile experience a decrease 
in abnormal returns of -2.03% (-2.47%), with the differences being significant at the 1% 
level. We can therefore conclude that firms with the highest increases in the representation of 
independent directors on their boards manage to improve their deal making. Conversely, 
those that experience a deterioration in corporate governance continue to destroy value. The 
direction of our findings is also similar for the other two measures of corporate governance, 
IDO and BCF.  
 
 
 
                                                 
22
 The probability of directors being sued by investors for a major merger decision they made has reached 90% 
in the recent period (Lajoux, 2015), while about 97% of all deals larger than $100 mil result in litigation battles 
(Gregory, 2014). Therefore, directors are more incentivised to perform their fiduciary duties to the best of their 
abilities, to avoid the negative publicity and other repercussions of an adverse decision in the court of law.  
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6. Has overall investment efficiency improved? 
 
Our analysis so far has focused on the effects of M&As on share prices. Although this is a 
standard approach for assessing value creation from acquisitions, it offers little information 
on how efficiently firms allocate funds to M&A investment opportunities relative to their 
growth prospects. More importantly, if firms make better acquisition decisions they should 
have also become more efficient in other investments, such as CAPEX and R&D or 
divestitures. To that end, we employ a measure of acquiring firms’ residual investment, 
RESINV, which captures the investment that diverges from the its expected level, given a set 
of factors that have been shown to predict the optimal investment level (see e.g. Richardson, 
2006; Biddle and Hilary, 2006). Specifically, we run the following regression for 20,970 
acquiring firm-year observations for the entire sample period:
23
 
 
INVi,t = α + βi Qi,t-1 + Leveragei, t-1 +Cashi,t-1 + Company Agei, t-1 + Sizei, t-1 + Stock Returni, t-1 
+ INVi, t-1 + FE + εi, 
 
Following Richardson (2006)  INVi,t is the sum of capital, R&D, plus acquisition 
expenditures minus sales of PPE and necessary maintenance for assets in place for firm i in 
year t from Compustat, scaled by prior-year book value of total assets. The independent 
variables are estimated at the end of the previous fiscal year t-1. Q is the market value of the 
firm (market value of equity and book value of debt) over total asset value. Leverage is the 
ratio of total debt over book value of equity. Cash is the log of total value of cash and 
equivalents. The company Age is in logarithmic form and it is calculated by the incorporation 
date as displayed in Compustat. Size is the log of total asset value. Stock Return is the 
percentage change in the market value of equity for the past year. We also include the 
previous year’s INV term. FE corresponds to industry fixed effects. The absolute value of the 
residual from the investment efficiency equation, εi, is the residual investment measure, 
RESINV, and it reflects the extent of managerial investment inefficiency. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
                                                 
23
 INV and all explanatory variables are estimated for each acquiring firm-year in our sample period. So a bidder 
completing a mega-deal in 2004 will be included in the regression for all 26 years subject to data availability. 
This is because the purpose of this test is to examine the efficiency of all firm’s investments not just M&As. In 
addition focusing on M&A years only would produce inflated investment figures. Nonetheless, including 
acquiring firms in the test only once, at their acquisition announcement year, still produces similar results.    
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A lower value of RESINV for acquiring companies post-2009 would provide a strong 
indication that firms have become more meticulous in the allocation of capital to investment 
opportunities. Table 8, Panel A shows the regression results and Panel B provides the 
univariate values of RESINV pre- and post-2010 as well as their differentials. The extent of 
investment inefficiency is significantly less pronounced post-2009 suggesting that corporate 
leaders have consistently aimed towards more optimal investment allocation in recent years. 
The turn towards more efficient investment strategies is in line with the documented 
improvement in acquisition performance and together attest to a shift in corporate decision 
making towards more value enhancing investment during the most recent period.  
 
7. Conclusion  
One of the most reiterated facts in the M&A literature is the tendency of acquiring firms to 
destroy value for their shareholders when consummating acquisitions of listed targets and 
especially in large deals which comprise the bulk of M&A market value. In stark contrast 
with the status quo, we show that this trend has been largely reversed post-2009. Acquisition 
gains during 2010-15 show signs of staggering improvement on a broad set of conventional 
measures estimated around the deal announcement. During the most recent period public 
acquisitions generate positive abnormal returns for acquiring shareholders, while stock-for-
stock deals, are no longer subject to significantly negative market reaction. The associated 
synergistic gains have also increased dramatically, indicating overall value creation from 
M&As on a large scale. The improvement in the quality of acquisition decisions is more 
pronounced among mega-deals where even private target acquisitions are received better by 
the market during the most recent period. We also provide evidence of acquiring firms 
employing more efficient investment allocation strategies, manifested in lower degrees of 
over- and under-investment. These changes in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis 
coincided with significant developments in the corporate governance environment, which 
have the potential to foster increasingly optimal investment decisions that cater for 
shareholder value creation more than ever before. Our evidence suggests that the higher 
acquisition gains can be at least partly explained by the variation in conventional governance 
characteristics. 
The documented findings mark a milestone in existing knowledge about gains from 
acquisitions and, in accordance with the neoclassical theory of M&As, challenge 
23 
 
conventional wisdom that acquiring firms destroy shareholder value more often than they 
create. They also imply that a financial crisis of grand scale and its shockwaves can 
ultimately contribute towards the more effective monitoring of corporate investment 
decisions as well as the associated implementation process, bringing sizeable gains to 
shareholders.  
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Table 1. Sample distribution.  
The table shows the annual number of deals and total consideration offered for public and private M&A deals. The 
sample is from SDC and includes completed and withdrawn deals announced between 1990 and 2015. Repurchases, 
recapitalisations, self-tenders, exchange offers, acquisitions of remaining interest, minority-stake purchases and 
intra-corporate restructuring are excluded. Transactions have an inflation-adjusted value of at least $5 mil and the 
target-to-acquirer relative size is at least 1%. The acquirer owns no more than 20% of the target prior to the 
announcement and seeks to own more than 50% following completion. Acquiring firms are U.S companies listed in 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ with data on CRSP. Targets are public or private firms. 
Year All Deals (n) 
All Deals 
($bil) 
Public Deals  
(n) 
Public Deals    
($ bil) 
Private Deals 
(n) 
Private Deals 
($bil) 
1990 503 126.18 107 67.34 396 58.84 
1991 547 94.73 132 51.82 415 42.91 
1992 783 122.78 147 59.28 636 63.50 
1993 1,017 265.65 194 193.18 823 72.47 
1994 1,265 251.72 302 147.16 963 104.56 
1995 1,340 419.67 344 303.06 996 116.61 
1996 1,668 603.62 360 435.26 1,308 168.36 
1997 2,066 858.11 464 599.19 1,602 258.92 
1998 2,165 1,523.24 494 1,270.94 1,671 252.30 
1999 1,680 1,607.03 433 1,307.71 1,247 299.32 
2000 1,454 1,221.96 368 905.96 1,086 316.01 
2001 999 676.37 267 427.68 732 248.68 
2002 876 282.70 173 155.40 703 127.30 
2003 832 274.42 187 161.53 645 112.89 
2004 996 442.48 192 317.87 804 124.62 
2005 982 611.29 170 406.71 812 204.59 
2006 986 698.01 197 525.26 789 172.75 
2007 957 536.55 193 305.38 764 231.17 
2008 684 437.30 136 320.86 548 116.44 
2009 467 426.70 116 289.62 351 137.08 
2010 599 310.96 126 153.11 473 157.85 
2011 631 459.93 92 249.85 539 210.08 
2012 694 321.90 118 141.49 576 180.41 
2013 581 317.53 114 158.03 467 159.50 
2014 692 716.08 130 504.21 562 211.87 
2015 614 947.25 138 697.88 476 249.36 
All 26,078 14,554.16 5,694 10,155.78 20,384 4,398.36 
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Figure 1. Deal Activity through time. 
The figure shows the annual number of transactions and the aggregate dollar value for the M&A sample 
described in Table 1.  
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Table 2. Summary statistics.  
The table presents means, medians, and sample size for a number of firm and deal characteristics for public and private 
deals and different sample periods along with differentials between sub-periods. The sample of M&As is described in Table 
1 and variable descriptions are reported in Appendix 1. The notation *, **, *** corresponds to statistical significance levels 
of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
  Public Deals  Private Deals 
  1990-2009 2010-15   1990-2009 2010-15  
 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1)   (3) (4) (3) - (4) 
        
Acquirer characteristics      
   
SIZE ($mil) mean 8,475.92 13,030.18 4,554.26***  2,386.08 5,282.29 2,896.20*** 
 median 1,287.49 1,977.43 689.93***  504.77 1,204.75 699.97*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
M/B mean 3.8 2.74 -1.06***  4.14 3.13 -1.01*** 
 median 2.27 1.76 -0.51***  2.33 2.08 -0.25*** 
 n 4,238 699   13,881 2,975  
FCF mean 0.08 0.1 0.02***  0.09 0.11 0.03*** 
 median 0.05 0.08 0.03***  0.08 0.1 0.02*** 
 n 4,236 699   13,847 2,975  
SERIAL % mean 34.32 32.03 -2.29  26.99 31.72 4.73*** 
 n 4,976 718   17291 3093  
HUBRIS % mean 44.5 34.51 -9.99***  47.21 41.32 -5.89*** 
 n 1,890 255   4236 1060  
EBC % mean 42.84 50.53 7.69***  40.27 49.58 9.30*** 
 median 44.92 54.17 9.25***  41.51 53.67 12.16*** 
 n 1,287 313   2660 1226  
BCF INDEX mean 1.9 1.65 -0.25***  1.99 1.8 -0.19*** 
 median 2 2 -0.00**  2 2 -0.00*** 
 n 1,246 274   3,039 1,048  
BI % mean 66.18 80.07 13.89***  65.4 79.24 13.84*** 
 median 69.23 83.33 14.10***  66.67 81.82 15.15*** 
 n 1,448 339   3,355 1,320  
IDO % mean 0.71 0.96 0.24*  0.97 1.15 0.18** 
 median 0.22 0.33 0.11***  0.34 0.43 0.08*** 
 n 1,124 336   2,825 1,304  
         
Target/Deal Characteristics         
SIZE ($mil) mean 1,352.01 2,181.61 829.60***     
 median 179.92 405.1 225.18***     
 n 3,733 478      
M/B mean 2.77 2.4 -0.36*     
 median 1.72 1.53 -0.19***     
 n 4,000 521      
DEAL VALUE ($mil) mean 1,658.2 2,652.61 994.42***  186.76 377.97 191.21*** 
 median 211.74 359.93 148.19***  41.55 90.81 49.27*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
RELSIZE mean 43.38 39.48 -3.90*  25.85 19.2 -6.65*** 
 median 20.11 22.12 2.02  8.88 7.09 -1.79*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
MEGA DEAL % mean 32.84 44.29 11.45***  6.86 15.03 8.17*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
STOCK % mean 56.2 38.09 -18.11***  24.82 8.22 -16.60*** 
 median 70.96 12.26 -58.70***  0 0 -0.00*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
CASH % mean 33.09 56.08 22.99***  38.31 54.93 16.62*** 
 median 0 60.09 60.09***  0 71.33 71.33*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
SYNERGY MOTIVE % mean 25.5 61.04 35.54***  7.08 33.7 26.62*** 
 n 1,514 675   4,803 2,555  
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Table 3 Continued. 
  Public Deals  Private Deals 
  1990-2009 2010-15   1990-2009 2010-15  
 
 (1) (2) (2) - (1)   (3) (4) (3) - (4) 
COMPETITION % mean 7.82 6.55 -1.27  0.63 0.16 -0.47*** 
 median 0 0 0  0 0 -0.00*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
HOSTILE % mean 3.42 1.39 -2.02***  0.06 0 -0.06*** 
 median 0 0 -0.00***  0 0 0 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
WITHDRAWN% mean 15.72 11 -4.71***  3.76 0.97 -2.80*** 
 median 0 0 0.00***  0 0 -0.00*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
DIVERS % mean 30.95 24.51 -6.44***  38.94 39.15 0.21 
 median 0 0 -0.00***  0 0 0 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
CROSS BORDER % mean 9.2 14.76 5.56***  13.03 21.53 8.50*** 
 median 0 0 -0.00***  0 0 -0.00*** 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
TIME TO COMPLET.  mean 137.5 132.61 -4.89  63.06 49.09 -13.97*** 
 median 122 111 -11.00*  36 25 -11.00*** 
 n 4,957 657   17,262 2,981  
PREMIUM % mean 45.91 46.44 0.53     
 median 36.69 37.48 0.79     
 n 3965 638      
HIGH MKT VAL % mean 45.82 46.1 0.28  47.76 48.11 0.34 
 median 0 0 0  0 0 0 
 n 4,976 718   17,291 3,093  
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Table 3. Acquisition Gains.  
The table reports mean and median values of M&A gain measures for a sample of 20,834 completed 
acquisitions. Panel A reports the results for all deals and Panel B for mega-deals, priced at least $500mil. 
Variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. Differentials are based on t-tests for means and Wilcoxon 
test for medians. The indicators *, **, *** correspond to significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively. 
    1990-2009  
(2) 
2010-2015  
(5) (5) - (2) 
Panel A: All Deals     
n  20,834 3,538 . 
ACAR mean 1.21*** 1.42*** 0.21** 
 median 0.44*** 0.68*** 0.25*** 
Private Deals     
n  16640 2959  
ACAR mean 1.78*** 1.49*** -0.29* 
 median 0.77*** 0.75*** -0.03 
Public Deals     
n  4,194 579  
ACAR     
All mean -1.08*** 1.05*** 2.13*** 
 median -0.84*** 0.29*** 1.14*** 
ALL CASH mean 0.59*** 1.85*** 1.26*** 
 median 0.30*** 0.60*** 0.29*** 
ALL STOCK mean -2.11*** 0.19 2.30*** 
 median -1.55*** -0.3 1.25*** 
OTHER mean -0.86*** 0.64 1.50*** 
 median -0.87*** 0.22 1.09*** 
ACAR+ mean 41.80*** 54.23*** 12.43*** 
$GAIN mean -178.14*** 30.22 208.37*** 
 
median -4.56*** 2.27** 6.82*** 
LARGE LOSS % mean 33.05*** 19.52*** -13.53*** 
TCAR3 mean 20.73*** 29.32*** 8.59*** 
 median 16.94*** 26.39*** 9.44*** 
SYNRGY mean 1.30*** 4.51*** 3.21*** 
 median 0.76*** 2.66*** 1.89*** 
$SYNRGY mean -25.44 308.59*** 334.03*** 
 median 5.66*** 55.78*** 50.12*** 
$VALUE ADDED mean -2.38 20.95*** 23.33*** 
 median 0.13 21.01*** 20.87*** 
     
Panel B: Mega- Deals     
n  2,474 676  
PUBLIC % mean 55.05 36.39  
ACAR mean -0.36** 2.54*** 2.90*** 
 median -0.38*** 1.34*** 1.72*** 
     
ACAR+ mean 47.01*** 61.54*** 14.53*** 
$GAIN mean -262.77*** 62.32 325.09*** 
 median -16.42*** 86.71*** 103.13*** 
LARGE LOSS % mean 10.79*** 6.36*** -4.43*** 
TCAR3 mean 19.93*** 24.87*** 5.78*** 
 median 17.39*** 23.72*** 7.84*** 
n  1,436 210 . 
SYNRGY  mean 0.74*** 5.05*** 4.31*** 
 median 0.42*** 2.61*** 2.19*** 
$SYNRGY  mean -75.65 542.69*** 618.34*** 
 median 31.77 253.97*** 222.21*** 
$VALUE ADDED mean -7.05** 18.21*** 25.26*** 
 median -3.32*** 21.79*** 25.11*** 
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Figure 2. Mega-Deal CARs through time  
The figure shows annual mean CARs estimated around the acquisition announcement, the corresponding 
5-year moving average and polynomial fitted line to account for the y-o-y fluctuation in CARs.
 
Figure 3. Evolution in acquirer CARs around mega-deal announcements.  
The figure shows the progression of CARs around the acquisition announcement for the two periods in 
our sample: 1990-2009, and 2010-2015. 
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Table 4. Acquirer return regressions.  
The table reports OLS regression coefficient estimates of ACAR and SYNRGY on the 2010-1015 dummy variable and other control variables. The 2010-2015 variable takes the value of 1 if the deal was 
announced during the years 2010-2015 and 0 otherwise. Mega Deals are least $500 mil in 2015 terms. For sample criteria see Table 1 description. Detailed variable definitions are reported in Appendix 1. 
All regressions include industry fixed effects based on the Fama and French 12 industry specification and regressions 2,4, 9, 11 and 13 include company fixed effects. The notation of *, **, *** 
corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
 Panel A: ACAR  Panel B: SYNRGY  
 
All All Public Public Private Public Private 
 
All All 
 
 Public Public Public Public 
      Mega Mega Mega Mega    Mega Mega 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Intercept 3.378*** 8.827* 2.657*** 12.395** 2.914*** -0.198 8.578*** 5.820*** 6.734  6.141*** 14.128** 5.351*** 14.060*
* 2010 - 2015 0.449*** 0.713*** 1.857*** 1.777*** 0.208 3.596*** 0.842** 1.779*** 1.249**  2.810*** 2.312*** 3.828*** 1.916** 
PUBLIC -2.406*** -2.285***      -3.221*** -2.463***      
ALL STOCK -0.559*** -0.404** -1.594*** -0.551* 0.081 -1.518*** -0.683 -1.688*** -0.877  -2.047*** -0.905** -1.750*** -0.923 
ASIZE -0.292*** -0.709*** -0.378*** -0.672*** -0.255*** -0.068 -0.703*** -0.373*** -0.613*  -0.606*** -0.854*** -0.489*** -0.846* 
RELSIZE 2.270*** 1.688*** -0.729*** -2.005*** 3.510*** -1.443*** 1.874*** 0.526* 0.268  2.398*** 2.555*** 1.670*** 1.884**
* M/B -0.006 -0.005 -0.029* -0.028 -0.004 -0.036 0.007 0.002 0.008  -0.046** -0.034 -0.024 -0.01 
COMPET 1.293*** 0.115 -0.246 0.334 5.877*** -1.380* -0.528 -1.293 0.262  -0.331 0.002 -1.376 1.191 
HOSTILE -0.25 -0.798 0.008 -0.059 -4.322 0.417 -1.756 0.732 0.26  2.469** 1.583 3.007** 1.313 
DIVERS -0.006 -0.223 -0.13 -0.549 -0.013 -0.214 -1.266*** -0.783** -0.984**  -0.154 0.085 0.128 0.056 
CROSS BORDER -0.106 0.08 0.687* 0.671 -0.179 1.115* -0.28 -0.153 0.654  -0.951 -2.088** -1.255 -0.571 
SERIAL -0.255** -0.340** 0.036 0.014 -0.307** -0.468 -0.142 -0.377 -0.483  0.126 0.191 -0.003 0.266 
LEVERAGE 0.006** -0.006 0.031*** 0.001 0.003 0.039*** 0.01 0.017** -0.004  0.021*** -0.003 0.025** -0.011 
HIGH MKT VAL 0.164* 0.185 0.172 0.228 0.171 0.799** -0.106 0.299 0.189  -0.382 0.003 -0.129 0.42 
FCF -0.131 0.277 2.215*** -0.402 -0.567 0.652 -1.123 -0.188 -1.037  3.555*** 3.772* 3.463** 3.296 
               
IND FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
COMP FE No Yes No Yes No No No No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Adj. R2 (%) 5.10 18.00 4.75 35.32 5.08 9.63 7.08 10.26 32.74  13.86 45.36 14.73 48.11 
N 20,481 20,481 4,196 4,196 16,285 1,511 1,427 2,938 2,938  3,126 3,126 1,315 1,315 
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Table 5. Quantile Regressions  
The table reports quantile regression coefficient estimates of ACAR3 and SYNERGY3 on a 2010-1015 indicator and other control 
variables for the sample of mega-deals. The quantile regressions are performed on the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles corresponding 
to specifications 8 and 12 in Table 4 where the dependent variable is ACAR and SYNRGY respectively. For sample criteria see 
Table 1 description. The goodness of fit statistic for quantile regressions is the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). For detailed 
variable descriptions see Appendix. The notation of *, **, *** corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% 
respectively.  
   ACAR    SYNRGY  
   Quantile    Quantile  
  
25th  50th  75th   25th  50th  75th  
 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept  -0.459 5.307*** 11.157***  -0.3962 7.291*** 11.975*** 
2010 - 2015  0.957*** 1.071*** 1.179***  1.918*** 2.049*** 3.595*** 
PUBLIC  -2.144*** -1.837*** -1.821***     
ALL STOCK  -2.713*** -1.787*** -1.207***  -1.381*** -1.286*** -1.373*** 
ASIZE  -0.013 -0.359*** -0.718***  -0.113 -0.604*** -0.805*** 
RELSIZE  -2.432*** -0.042 3.068***  -0.161 1.229** 3.102*** 
M/B  -0.121*** -0.003 0.056  -0.164** -0.058 0.029 
COMPET  -1.671 -0.351 -1.140  -1.302 -1.291 -0.899 
HOSTILE  1.007 -0.223 -1.601  1.802 1.339 1.179 
DIVERS  -0.323 -0.769*** -1.258***  0.420 -0.003 -0.501 
CROSS BORDER  -0.220 -0.124 -0.367  -1.271 -0.412 -0.890 
SERIAL  -0.050 -0.120 0.218  0.062 0.221 -0.224 
LEVERAGE  0.009 0.017** 0.011  0.020 0.024** 0.023 
HIGH MKT VAL  0.901*** 0.224 -0.084  0.923*** -0.118 -0.470 
FCF  0.678 0.407 -0.942  5.337*** 2.627** 1.814 
  
   
 
   IND FE  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
AIC  6,187.19 7,820.88 6,532.89  2,504.72 3,133.76 2,542.50 
N  2,938 2,938 2,938  1,315 1,315 1,315 
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Table 6. Propensity Score Matching Adjusted Gains.  
The table reports acquisition performance using propensity scores that are estimated from logit regressions of post-2009 deal 
occurrence on deal and firm-level characteristics. Panel A reports results from the logit estimation where the dependent variable equals 
1 if the deal was announced during the 2010-15 period and zero otherwise. Panel B reports CAR and SYNRGY gains for 2010-15 deals 
(Treated sample) and propensity score matched returns from pre-2010 deals (Control sample). Difference is the return differential 
between the Control and Treated samples. N is the number of observations and pseudo R2 (%) is the pseudo R-square. P-values are 
reported below regression estimates. For Panel B statistical significance is reported only for difference estimates. The notation of *, **, 
*** corresponds to statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Panel A: Logit estimation results 
   ACAR SYNRGY   
Post-2009=1   (1) (2)   
Intercept   -1.916*** -2.329***   
PUBLIC   -0.491***    
ALL STOCK   -1.726*** -1.542***   
ASIZE   0.132*** 0.172**   
RELSIZE   -0.067 0.121   
M/B   -0.015* -0.035   
COMPET   -0.969*** -0.663   
HOSTILE   -1.999* -14.411   
DIVERS   -0.123 -0.516***   
CROSS BORDER   0.097 0.186   
SERIAL   -0.360*** -0.0264   
LEVERAGE   0.006** 0.004   
HIGH MKT VAL   0.319*** 0.254   
FCF   -0.233 -0.030   
Industry FE   Yes Yes   
N   2,939 1,316   
Pseudo R2 (%)   10.62 8.93   
Panel B: Adjusted post-2009 CARs based on PSM  
   One-to-one 30 Nearest 50 Nearest Gaussian Kernel 
ACAR Treated  mean 2.424 2.424 2.424 2.424 
 Control mean 0.487 0.755 0.744 0.478 
 Difference  1.937*** 1.669*** 1.679*** 1.946*** 
SYNRGY Treated mean 5.074 5.074 5.074 5.074 
 Control  mean 2.212 1.308 1.137 1.177 
 Difference  2.861*** 3.766*** 3.936*** 3.896*** 
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Table 7. Corporate Governance two stage regressions.  
The table reports coefficients from 2-stage instrumental variable OLS regressions. In first stage regressions, the dependent variable in 
specifications 1, 3 and 5 is the percentage of independent directors in the board (BI), the independent directors’ share of ownership 
(IDO), and the index of antitakeover provisions (BCF), respectively. The main explanatory variable in a time indicator for deals 
occurring from 2010 through 2015. The dependent variable in the second stage regression is the acquirer cumulative abnormal return 
for a 3-day window surrounding the acquisition announcement (ACAR). BI, IDO, and BCF correspond to predicted corporate 
governance values from stage-one. For detailed variable definitions see Appendix 1. The notation of *, **, *** corresponds to 
statistical significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.  
  1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage  1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 
 
BI CAR  IDO CAR  BCF CAR 
 
 
(1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Intercept  54.350*** 1.62  2.230*** -9.336**  3.631*** 18.362*** 
2010 - 2015  0.139***   0.274**   -0.350***  
PUBLIC  0.318 -2.551***  -0.108 -1.844***  -0.095 -2.509*** 
ALL STOCK  -2.501** -1.495***  0.126 -2.459***  -0.151 -2.869*** 
ASIZE  1.602*** -0.922***  -0.180*** 0.726**  -0.161*** -1.071*** 
RELSIZE  -0.853 -1.156**  -0.065 -0.708  -0.161* -1.199** 
M/B  -0.169** 0.03  -0.002 0.008  -0.025*** -0.058 
COMPET  0.042 -0.467  0.096 -1.478  -0.084 -1.643 
HOSTILE  -4.467 1.438  0.045 0.948  -0.339 -0.149 
DIVERS  0.516 -1.086***  -0.023 -0.859**  -0.011 -0.536 
CROSS BORDER  -0.025 -0.541  -0.005 -0.543  -0.009 0.139 
SERIAL  -1.717** 0.326  -0.096 1.040**  0.135* 0.299 
LEVERAGE  -0.036 0.018  0.009*** -0.054***  -0.005* 0.017 
HIGH MKT VAL  -1.632** 0.328  0.013 -0.478  -0.313*** -0.343 
FCF  1.923 0.533  -0.069 1.958  0.491* 3.265** 
BI   0.130***       
IDO      7.846***    
BCF         -3.022** 
          
Industry FE  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 (%)  18.111 10.502  2.873 10.377  8.609 10.224 
N  1616 1616  1385 1385  1234 1234 
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Table 8 Acquirer Investment Efficiency.  
The table reports estimates of investment inefficiency based on Richardson (2006) for the sample of acquiring firms 
involved in mega-deals. In Panel A, the coefficients are from a regression of Total New Investment, INVi,t, which is 
the sum of capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions minus sales of PPE and necessary maintenance 
for assets in place for firm i in year t from Compustat, scaled by total assets. Qi, t-1 is the book value of total assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by book value of total assets for firm i in year 
t-. Leveragei, t-1 is calculated as total debt over common equity for firm i in year t-1. Cashi, t-1 is the logarithmic 
transformation of 1 plus the ratio cash and cash equivalents over total assets for firm i in year t-1. Agei, t-1 is the log of 
the difference between the year of the observation and the incorporate date for firm i in year t-1. Sizei, t-1 is the 
logarithmic transformation of total assets for firm i in year t-1. INVi, t-1 is the lagged term of the dependent variable. 
Stock Returni, t-1 is the total annual change in the market capitalization of firm i in the year t-1. We trace each 
acquirer’s investment for the entire sample period (1990-2015). Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% to 
remove outliers. Industry fixed effects are included in specification 2. Panel B reports mean and median residual 
investment (RESINV) which is the absolute value of the residuals from regression (2) in Panel A. n is the number of 
firm-year observations and Adj. R2 (%) is the adjusted R-square. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Total new investment regressions (INVi ,t ) 
  
(1) (2) 
Intercept 
 
0.133*** 0.158*** 
Q (t-1) 
 
0.024*** 0.023*** 
Leverage (t-1) 
 
-0.001** -0.001** 
Cash (t-1) 
 
0.007*** 0.008*** 
Age (t-1) 
 
-0.006*** -0.007*** 
Size (t-1) 
 
-0.016*** -0.015*** 
INV (t-1) 
 
0.087*** 0.062*** 
Stock Return (t-1) 
 
0.008*** 0.008*** 
Industry FE 
 
No Yes 
Adj R2 (%) 
 
10.157 12.157 
n 
 
17,568 17,568 
    
Panel B: Residual Investment (RESINV) 
 
1990-2009 2010-2015 Diff. 
 
   
mean 0.088 0.071 -0.017*** 
median 0.048 0.041 -0.007*** 
n 13,332 4,237  
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Appendix 1. Variable Descriptions.  
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Acquisition Performance 
ACAR Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns over the 3 days around the avquisition 
announcement day. The model parameters are estimated over a window (-255, -46) 
relative to the announcement. 
$GAIN The product of ACAR (-1,+1) and the market capitalisation of the acquirer one month 
prior to the acquisition announcement.   
LARGE LOSS  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if $GAIN indicates a loss equal to or greater 
than $1 bill., following Moeller et al. (2005). 
SYNRGY The market value-weighted 3-day cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirer and 
target combined where the value weights are from one month prior to the acquisition 
announcement.  
$SYNERGY The synergy gain (SYNRGY) multiplied by the sum of the market capitalisation of the 
acquirer and target 30 days prior to the acquisition announcement. 
TCAR3 Target cumulative abnormal returns over the 3 days around the acquisition 
announcement. The model’s parameters are estimated over the window (-255, -46) 
relative to the announcement. 
$VALUE ADDED The ratio of total market capitalisation change for the acquirer and target around the 
acquisition announcement adjusted for market movements and scaled by the deal 
value. 
ACAR+ Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the ACAR is positive and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B: Acquirer Characteristics 
FCF 
The ratio of cash flow from operations over the book value of assets at the year-end of 
the fiscal year t-1. 
HUBRIS 
Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the Acquirer CEO has not exercised 67% in-the-
money options twice during her tenure and 0 otherwise based on Malmendier and Tate 
(2005).  
LEVERAGE 
Acquirer’s long- and short-term debt divided by total assets at the year-end of the 
fiscal year t-1. 
SIZE 
Acquirer market capitalisation in 2015 dollar terms 30 days prior to the deal 
announcement.  
M/B 
Acquirer market cap over the total book value of equity. The latter is the sum of 
stockholders’ equity, deferred taxed and investment tax credit (if available), and 
preferred stock, all at fiscal year-end t-1 and denominated in 2015 dollar terms. We 
use redemption, liquidation, or par value for the preferred stock estimation, depending 
on data availability. Stockholders’ equity is as reported by Compustat; the sum of 
book value of common equity and preferred stock, or the book value of assets minus 
total liabilities, depending on data availability. 
BCF INDEX 
The number of antitakeover provisions available at the firm’s disposal in the year of 
the acquisition as reported in IRRC. It has a minimum value of 1 and a maximum 
value of 6 (see Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
BI 
The percentage of independent directors in the Board of Directors in the year of the 
acquisition as reported in ISS. 
EBC  
The sum of stock- and option-based compensation as a percentage of total 
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compensation in the fiscal year t-1. (see Chauvin and Shenoy, 2001). 
IDO 
The ownership % of all independent directors combined in the fiscal year t-1. 
SERIAL %  
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an acquirer has consummated at least 3 
deals within 5 years and 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Target and Deal Characteristics 
SIZE ($mil) Target market capitalisation in 2015 dollar terms 30 days prior to the deal 
announcement. For missing values, we retrieve information from the next available 
day up to 10 days from the announcement. 
M/B Target share price 4 weeks before the announcement over the book value of equity 
from Compustat. 
ALL STOCK  Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the consideration was 100% stock and 0 
otherwise. 
STOCK % The percentage of deal consideration paid in stock. 
CASH % The percentage of deal consideration paid in cash. 
COMPETE 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there were more than one bids for the 
target firm and 0 otherwise. 
CROSS BORDER 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target’s country is not the U.S. 
DEAL VALUE 
The deal value in 2015 dollar terms. 
DIVERS 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the 2-digit SIC codes of the acquirer and 
target are different and 0 otherwise. 
HIGH MKT VAL  
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if deal announcement month is classified as 
a high market valuation period and 0 otherwise. The classification is based on a de-
trended P/E ratio as in Bouwman et al. (2009). 
HOSTILE 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the deal is labelled as hostile and 0 
otherwise. 
PREMIUM 
The 4-week premium paid for the target company as given by SDC. 
PUBLIC 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target is a publicly listed firm and 0 
otherwise. 
RELSIZE 
The ratio of deal value over the acquirer market capitalisation one month prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  
SYNRGY MOTIVE  Indicator that takes the value of 1 if the Deal Purpose Code in SDC which is derived 
from actual acquisition announcements includes synergistic gains (Code: SYN), and 0 
otherwise. 
 
TIME 
The number of days between deal announcement and completion.  
WITHDRAWN 
Dummy takes the value of 1 if the deal was eventually withdrawn and 0 otherwise. 
Panel E: Investment Inefficiency Regression 
Age The logarithmic transformation of the difference between the year t-1 and the year of 
the incorporation. 
Cash The logarithmic transformation of 1 plus the ratio of company cash and cash 
equivalents over total assets in year t-1. 
Leverage The ratio of company total debt over the book value of common stock in year t-1. 
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Q The company book value of total assets, minus the book value of equity, plus the 
market value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets in year t-1. 
Size The logarithmic transformation of the company’s total assets in year t-1 . 
Stock Returns The company year-on-year difference of year-end market capitalisation for the year t-
1. 
INV The sum of company’s capital expenditures, R&D expenditures, and acquisitions 
minus sales of PPE and necessary maintenance for assets in place scaled by total 
assets. The estimation of the variable is based on both year t and t-1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Appendix 2. Largest 10 Deals per sub-period. 
Period # Year Announced Year Completed Acquiring Company  Target Company Deal Value $ bil CAR % (-1, 1) CAR % (-20, 1) 
1
9
9
0
-1
9
9
9
 
1 1999 2000 Pfizer Inc Warner-Lambert Co 126.87 -11.49 -14.77 
2 1998 1999 Exxon Corp Mobil Corp 114.80 -3.08 -5.00 
3 1998 1998 Travelers Group Inc Citicorp 105.51 14.76 13.61 
4 1998 1999 SBC Communications Inc Ameritech Corp 91.02 -8.00 -5.84 
5 1998 1998 NationsBank Corp BankAmerica Corp 89.63 6.94 9.77 
6 1999 2000 Qwest Commun Intl Inc US WEST Inc 80.11 -18.87 -13.37 
7 1998 1999 AT&T Corp Tele-Communications Inc 77.93 -9.67 -6.68 
8 1998 2000 Bell Atlantic Corp GTE Corp 77.68 2.52 1.55 
9 1999 2000 AT&T Corp MediaOne Group Inc 70.11 -6.65 -5.40 
10 1997 1998 WorldCom Inc MCI Communications Corp 61.89 3.13 15.73 
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
9
 
1 2001 2002 Comcast Corp AT&T Broadband & Internet Svcs 96.42 -6.55 1.09 
2 2006 2006 AT&T Inc BellSouth Corp 85.44 -5.35 0.56 
3 2002 2003 Pfizer Inc Pharmacia Corp 78.43 -11.31 -13.64 
4 2009 2009 Pfizer Inc Wyeth 74.34 -9.93 -7.20 
5 2005 2005 Procter & Gamble Co Gillette Co 66.64 -4.51 -2.27 
6 2000 2001 Chevron Corp Texaco Inc 59.01 -5.25 -6.48 
7 2000 2001 JDS Uniphase Corp SDL Inc 56.63 -21.01 -32.54 
8 2008 2009 Bank of America Corp Merrill Lynch & Co Inc 53.69 -3.77 18.06 
9 2000 2000 Chase Manhattan Corp,NY JP Morgan & Co Inc 46.19 -12.62 -4.10 
10 2009 2010 Exxon Mobil Corp XTO Energy Inc 44.52 -5.06 -5.31 
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
5
 
1 2014 2015 AT&T Inc DirecTV Inc 48.14 -2.62 0.26 
2 2014 2015 Medtronic Inc Covidien PLC 42.78 0.51 -1.92 
3 2011 2012 Express Scripts Inc Medco Health Solutions Inc 30.95 9.12 0.95 
4 2011 2012 Duke Energy Corp Progress Energy Inc 27.21 -0.80 -1.55 
5 2011 2012 Kinder Morgan Inc El Paso Corp 25.29 2.77 9.66 
6 2014 2015 Reynolds American Inc Lorillard Inc 25.08 0.70 3.93 
7 2010 2011 CenturyLink Inc Qwest Commun Intl Inc 24.22 -6.95 -6.92 
8 2011 2012 Johnson & Johnson Synthes Inc 21.18 4.64 6.53 
9 2014 2014 Facebook Inc WhatsApp Inc 19.49 2.94 18.40 
10 2011 2012 United Technologies Corp Goodrich Corp 17.05 -3.05 0.91 
 
 
